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Maximum-profit two-sided pricing in service
platforms based on Wireless Sensor Networks
Luis Guijarro, Vicent Pla, Jose R. Vidal, and Maurizio Naldi
Abstract—A business model for Internet-of-Things-based ser-
vices is proposed whereby a platform serves as an intermediary
between human users and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs).
The platform, acting as a monopolist, posts both the price
paid by each user and the price paid to each WSN so as to
maximize its profits. In this setting, we propose, analyze and
compare two alternative payment schemes for the WSN side. We
demonstrate that the two payment schemes are equivalent from
every stakeholders point of view. And then we show that there is
a user cost ceiling, which depends both on the number of WSNs
and the strength of the cross externality that the WSNs creates
on the users, below which the take-up is maximum.
Index Terms—Wireless sensor networks, two-sided markets,
service provision.
I. INTRODUCTION
The “Internet of Things” (IoT) is one of the hottest top-
ics being debated today across industries worldwide. The
estimates of the number of smart objects in homes, offices,
factories, vehicles and elsewhere are 50 billion by 2020, up
from 12.5 billion in 2010 [1]. Although smart objects are
becoming omnipresent, the fact is that the market for services
related to these objects is immature.
This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of a
sustainable business model for wireless-sensor-network-based
services, which is a likely scenario for the IoT. Specifically,
this paper proposes a business model built around a platform
which distributes the sensing information to the relevant par-
ties and takes care of bundling the solutions, setting the tariffs,
billing the customers and providing customer care [1].
In the analysis of this platform-based business model for
IoT, we borrow the concept of two-sided markets, as presented
by [2] and as analyzed by [3]. Some specifics related to the
WSN’s operation are incorporated in the model, such as the
influence of the sensing rate over the user utility, and the
variable cost dependence on the sensing rate. We investigate
how the pricing schemes that a platform applies to each side
of the IoT service (users and wireless sensor networks) may
increase the total service take up at each side [4].
As far as the authors are aware, there are some reports
that discuss which requirements a sustainable business model
should comply in an Internet of Things scenario [5] [6], but
there is no paper that approaches this issue formally as our
manuscript.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Next section
describes the business model and the two payment methods,
and the basis of the analysis is described. Section III presents
the main results of the paper and Section IV draws some
conclusions and points to future lines of work.
II. MODEL
The scenario modeled in this paper comprises N Wireless
Sensor Infrastructure Providers (WSIP), one service provider,
and M users. Two models are presented in this section,
where the difference lays in the payment made by the service
provider to each WSIP . A monopolistic service provider is
then assumed in the paper. We acknowledge that no barrier can
be identified in this market, so that more realistic scenarios
where several service providers compete against each other
should be modeled. However, at the current stage, the study
of a monopolistic model can be regarded as representative
and provide valuable insights to approach the study of more
complex scenarios.
A. Lump-sum payment model
This is the baseline model, hereafter also referred as model
A, where the service provider pays a lump sum to each WSIP.
The model is depicted in Fig. 1.
Each WSIP operates and manages a Wireless Sensor Net-
work (WSN). The WSN island senses information which is
bundled by the service provider in order to compose useful
services to the users.
WSN j is able to sense at a rate rj . This rate not only
influences the user utility, as stated below, but also contributes
to the costs incurred. Specifically, we model WSIP j’s costs as
proportional to its sensing rate, i.e. f ·rj , modeling the fact that
the more a WSN senses, the more resources it consumes, e.g.,
battery. We model the heterogeneity in terms of rj through a
random variable R uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1].
Additionally, the service provider pays a lump-sum fee q to
each WSIP. Although more sophisticated payments may be
modeled at this stage—e.g., differential pricing—, a simple
payment is desirable so as to remain focused on the effects
that the alternative payment presented in Section II-B may
introduce in the system.
Therefore, provided that WSIP j joins the service provider
platform, it will get the profits
ΠAj = q − frj . (1)
Otherwise, the WSIP will get zero revenues and profits. The






Fig. 1. Lump-sum payment model
Users are interested in accessing a range of services that the
service provider composes from the WSN islands operated by
the WSIPs.
Each user has a utility that comprises both objective as-
pects and unobserved aspects. The unobserved aspects may
reflect subjective features of the service consumption, and
these aspects are responsible for the heterogeneity of the user
consumption behavior. We propose to model these aspects with
a uniform random variable that reduces the objective part of
the utility in a linear manner. More specifically, each user
has a type denoted by xi, which is modeled as a uniformly
distributed random variable X = U [0, 1], and a disutility equal
to t times xi reduces the objective part of the utility 1.
As regards the objective aspects, sensor nodes produce util-
ity by sensing and reporting data to the WSIP and ultimately,
to the service provider. Therefore, following [7], the utility
that the users get from the WSN-based services is assumed
to depend on the aggregate sensing rate
∑n
j=1 rj , through a
positive, non-decreasing and concave function Φ(·).
Therefore, provided that user i subscribes for the service,
his/her utility is specified by




− txi − p, (2)
where v is the net value that a user receives from accessing
the platform irrespective of the amount of service received,
accounting also for network access fees; and p is the lump-sum
payment for the service. From (2), it follows that there always
exists an cross externality from the number of WSIPs to the
number of users; that is, the more WSIPs join the platform,
the greater utility the users get. We assume that a user will get
zero utility if he/she chooses not to subscribe for the service.
The service provider performs two basic roles in the model:
it composes services which are based on the information
sensed by the different WSN islands; and it acts as an inter-
mediary between users and WSIPs, which allows to decouple
the pricing schemes on each side.
The profits of the service provider is given by the revenues
from the users (pm) minus the cost incurred in paying the
WSIPs (qn):
ΠAp = pm− qn. (3)
Analysis: As hinted above, we will see that the demand
for services depends on the expected number of WSIPs
connected, since the more WSIPs are aggregated by the service
provider, the more users will subscribe for service.
1This approach can be also interpreted as an generalization of the Hotelling
model, where xi is the user location, the service provider is located at x = 0,
and txi is the transportation cost.
We assume, first, that the number of WSIPs that join the
platform is ne and that the rate from each of these WSIPs is
rej , j = 1, . . . , n
e.
User i will subscribe to the service if ui ≥ 0, which


















where Ψ is defined as follows:
Ψ(u) =

0 if u < 0
u if 0 ≤ u < 1
1 if 1 ≤ u.
(6)
The number of subscribers M is then a random variable,
specifically, a binomial random variable with parameters M
and (5). Therefore, the expected number of subscribers, con-
ditioned to the values ne, re1, r
e
2, · · · , rene , is equal to









We proceed now in a similar way for the number of
connected WSIPs. WSIP j will join the platform if ΠAj ≥ 0,
which corresponds to a random event with probability
P (q − fR ≥ 0) = P (R ≤ q/f) = Ψ (q/f) . (8)
Following a similar reasoning as with m, the expected number
of WSIPs is equal to
n , E [N ] = NΨ (q/f) . (9)





∣∣∣R ≤ q/f] = 1
2
Ψ (q/f) . (10)
We now look for an equilibrium where each side’s assumptions




j = n · r, so
that, Equation (7) becomes
m = MΨ ((v + Φ(nr)− p)/t) . (11)
Finally, from (10), (9) and (11), we can compute the
expected WSIP and service provider profits as functions of p
and q. Assuming that the monopoly platform is free to set both
subscription price p to the users and fee q to the providers, the
platform faces the problem of choosing p and q to maximize
Πp. Thus, an maximization problem should be solved, as it is





q + z ·m
Fig. 2. Per-subscriber payment model
B. Per-subscriber payment model
In this model, hereafter also referred as model B, we
propose that the service provider pays an additional amount z
per subscriber to each connected WSIP, i.e. the total payment
is now q+zm, where m is the number of users that subscribe
to the service2. The payment flow is shown in Fig. 2. This
payment is intended to create an additional incentive for the
WSIPs to join the platform, since they will be rewarded
collectively as more users subscribe. We already know that the
number of subscribers depends on the number of WSIPs that
join the platform. This way, a closed-loop feedback may be
created that increases both the platform profits and the service
take up.
The utility that a subscriber gets from the service provider
is still given by (2). However, WSIP’s profits and the service
provider profits are now given by
ΠBj = q + zm− frj , (12)
ΠBp = pm− (q + zm)n. (13)
Eq. (12) shows that there exists now a cross externality
from the users’ side to the WSIPs’ side which was absent
in the previous model—see (1)—and which is introduced by
the proposed payment. This cross externality supplements the
one present in the user utility—see (2). A bidirectional cross
externality is then generated. This may recreate a two-sided
market where the service provider acts as a platform. If so,
the service provider would internalize the bidirectional cross
externality, improve its profits and increase the take-up of
either the users or the WSIPs, or both.
Analysis: Let us assume that the number of subscribers
is me. WSIP j will join the platform if ΠBj ≥ 0, which
corresponds to a random event with probability
P (q + zme − fR ≥ 0) = Ψ ((q + zme)/f) . (14)
Following a similar reasoning as in previous section, the
following values result:
m = MΨ ((v + Φ(nr)− p)/t) , (15)
n = NΨ ((q + zm)/f) , (16)
r = 1/2Ψ ((q + zm)/f) = n/2N. (17)
The expressions for m and n are obtained by solving the
system of equations (15) and (16), which is more involved
that the direct substitution of (9) into (11) in model A.
A profit maximization problem needs again to be solved, as
it is described below.
2The proposed payment is different from a two-part tariff. While the
proposed payment depends on the opposite side to the side where it is applied,
a two-part tariff does not.
III. RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the numerical results for the two
models analyzed in the previous section.
A squared root function has been chosen for Φ, following






The profit maximization problems A and B have been first
solved analytically. Since Ψ is a piecewise linear function
defined in three different intervals, solving (15) and (16) —
or either, trivially, (11) and (9)—yields nine solution types
for (m,n): m = n = 0; m = 0, 0 < n < N ; m = 0,
n = N ; 0 < m < M , n = 0; 0 < m < M , 0 < n < N ;
0 < m < M , n = M ; m = M , n = 0; m = M , 0 < n < N ;
and m = M , n = M . Each solution has a feasibility region
in the pq-plane that is delimited by a piecewise linear curve,
and by substituting the solution into (13)—or either (3)—, in
each region we have a function Πp(p, q) that is a polynomial
of degree 1 or 2. To solve the maximization problem, we first
solve a constrained maximization problem in each of the nine
regions, and then compare the obtained maxima among them
to obtain the global maximum. We would like to stress that
both maximization problems have been approached using a
similar methodology, but the specifics of the solving have been
different, which cannot be shown here due to the page limit.
For the detailed derivation of expressions, the reader is referred
to the technical report that accompanies this paper [8].
The problems have also been solved numerically, where it
was not possible to use any gradient-based algorithm, because
in both models the function to optimize is not smooth. Fur-
thermore, the maximization problem in model B is non-linear.
For this reason we have used a gradient-free algorithm, which
has a much more robust behavior under such problems. We
have chosen the modification of the cuckoo search algorithm
described in [9].
A. Payment equivalence
The proposed payment q+zm in model B aimed to generate
a cross externality that complemented the one that the number
of connected WSIPs had created on the subscribers’ utility.
Both analytical and numerical results have been obtained for
the two payments, and it can be shown that both are equivalent
from every stakeholder’s point of view, that is, the service
provider’s and WSIP’s profits, the number of subscribers, and
the number of connected WSIPs. The price paid by the users
is identical in both payments; as regards the fee paid to the
WSIPs, the results show that qA = qB + mz, that is, the
platform adjusts qB to produce an overall payment to each
WSIP that is equal to the fee qA.
B. Optimum analysis
The following figures show the optimum price p and fees
qA and qB (Fig.3), the corresponding values m and n (Fig. 4),
and the maximum Πp and corresponding Πw —which is the
mean value of the profit of a connected WSIP (Fig. 5). All
values are represented as functions of parameter t 3.
3The plots have been generated with parameter values v = 1, b = 1,
f = 1, z = 0.1, M = 40 and N = 30. Furthermore, B > 1. If B ≤ 1, the
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Fig. 4. Number of subscribers and of WSIPs as a function of t
We can state the following facts:
• As stated above, although qA and qB are different, they
comply with qA = qB + mz (Fig. 3).
• Provided that t ≤ C, where C , 12 (v + b
√
N/2), i.e.,
that the user costs are small compared with a quantity that
increases with the number of WSIPs N and the strength
of the cross externality b,
– in the optimum, all users subscribe (m = M ) and
all WSIPs connect (n = N ) (Fig. 4);
– as t increases, which means higher costs born by
the users, the platform chooses a lower p in order
to compensate for the increase in t (Fig. 3), and
it succeeds in keeping m = M (Fig. 4), but Πp
decreases (Fig. 5).





– the platform can no longer avoid that m decreases
(Fig. 4), so that it has no incentive in lowering p
(Fig. 3);
– qA and qB are set to a value that keeps all WSIPs
connected (n = N , Fig. 4) and its profits Πw
C  B·C
 1/(2B)











Fig. 5. Service provider’s profits and WSIP’s profits as a function of t
unaltered (Fig. 5);
– the decrease in m causes that service provider’s profit
Πp decreases (Fig. 5).
• As t increases beyond B · C, i.e., a quantity which
increases almost linearly with the number of users M
and b,
– the platform chooses a lower price p and a lower q to
try to compensate for the increase in t (Fig. 3), but
it cannot avoid that both m and n decrease (Fig. 4);
– the decrease in qA and in qB + mz causes that Πw
decreases (Fig. 5);
– the decrease in m and in n causes that Πp decreases
(Fig. 5).
The above facts show that there is a user cost ceiling C—
modulated by B, under some conditions, below which the
take-ups m and n are maximum. Beyond this cost ceiling,
the take-ups decrease. Note that high values for C can be
achieved in scenarios with a high availability of WSIPs and
with a strong externality b.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A business model is analyzed for a service platform that
intermediates between WSNs and users. Two payment meth-
ods have been proposed and analyzed through solving the
respective profit maximization problems, and the equivalence
between the two methods have been stated. The behavior of
the model for a typical parameter setting has been described.
We argue that the equivalence between the two payment
methods is an intrinsic characteristic of the business model.
Specifically, we argue that the payment flows to and from
the WSIPs makes the system insensitive to a change in the
payment method.
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